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Parliament’s Response to Charkaoui:
Bill C-3 and the Special Advocate
Regime under IRPA
David Dunbar and Scott Nesbitt*

Although the constitutionality of the legislative approach to terrorism
will ultimately be determined by the judiciary in its role as the arbiter
of constitutional disputes for the country, we must not forget that the
legislative and executive branches also desire, as democratic agents of
the highest rank, to seek solutions and approaches that conform to
fundamental rights and freedoms. 1

I. INTRODUCTION
Some commentators have characterized the relationship between the
judiciary and legislatures under the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms2 as a “dialogue”. The metaphor initially was put forward in
response to the anti-democratic critique of unelected judges striking
down legislation. It emphasizes that judicial decisions in Charter cases
rarely represent the final word on any particular legal issue. Such
decisions usually do not simply invalidate government action; more
typically, they define the broad constitutional parameters in which the
government may pursue legitimate policy objectives and give
legislatures an opportunity to consider their options. In this way,
according to the dialogue metaphor, judicial decisions actually may
encourage democratic debate and ensure that legislatures seek to

*
David Dunbar is General Counsel with the federal Department of Justice in the Canada
Border Services Agency Legal Services Unit. Scott Nesbitt is Counsel with the federal Department
of Justice in the Citizenship Immigration and Public Safety Law Portfolio. The views expressed in
this paper are solely those of the authors.
1
Re Application under s. 83.28 of the Criminal Code, [2004] S.C.J. No. 40, [2004] 2
S.C.R. 248, at para. 5 (S.C.C.).
2
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Constitution Act 1982
(U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
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accomplish their legitimate legislative objectives in a manner that
conforms to constitutionally protected fundamental rights and freedoms.3
Considered together, the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in
Charkaoui v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)4 and
Parliament’s enactment of Bill C-35 illustrate how the constitutional
dialogue can function effectively, even in the contentious context of
national security law.6 In Charkaoui, the Court accepted that the security
certificate regime under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act7
was directed at legitimate policy objectives, namely, the removal of noncitizens inadmissible to Canada and the protection of sensitive national
security information. However, the Court also found two specific aspects
of the statutory scheme to be unconstitutional: the absence of a timely
detention review for foreign nationals named in a certificate; and the in
camera, ex parte hearing process. The Court identified a series of
options available to Parliament to remedy these constitutional infirmities
and suspended its declaration of invalidity for one year to allow
Parliament to determine whether, and if so how, to amend the
provisions. Parliament, in turn, considered its options and amended the
IRPA to include a special advocate regime. The result is a new
legislative scheme which ensures that fundamental rights and freedoms
are protected while still achieving the legitimate policy objectives
underlying the certificate process.
The remainder of the paper is organized into four parts. Part II
provides background information on security certificates and explains
the statutory regime at issue in Charkaoui. Part III reviews the
Charkaoui decision, noting not only those specific aspects of the
certificate regime which the Court found to be unconstitutional, but also
3
P. Hogg & A. Bushell, “The Charter Dialogue between Courts and Legislatures (or
perhaps the Charter of Rights isn’t such a bad thing after all)” (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 75; K.
Roach, The Supreme Court on Trial: Judicial Activism or Democratic Dialogue (Toronto: Irwin
Law, 2001); and P. Hogg, A. Bushell & W. Wright, “Charter Dialogue Revisited — or ‘Much ado
about metaphors’” (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1.
4
[2007] S.C.J. No. 9, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Charkaoui”].
5
An Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (certificate and special
advocate) and to make a consequential amendment to another Act, now S.C. 2008, c. 3 (in force
February 22, 2008) [hereinafter “Bill C-3” or the “Bill”].
6
See K. Roach, “Sharpening the Dialogue Debate: The Next Decade of Scholarship”,
(2007) 45 Osgoode Hall L.J. 169, at 186-89, where the author suggests that “the post 9/11 security
context may be a particularly rich site for institutional dialogue”.
7
S.C. 2001, c. 27 [hereinafter “IRPA”]. For ease of reference, when referring to
provisions contained in the former Part 1, Division 9 of IRPA that Bill C-3 repealed, the citation
“former IRPA” is used.
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the range of permissible action the Court afforded to Parliament for
fixing those constitutional deficiencies. Next, Part IV explains the
special advocate regime enacted under Bill C-3, its rationale and its
subsequent implementation. Finally, Part V offers some brief concluding
remarks.

II. BACKGROUND: THE SECURITY CERTIFICATE REGIME
UNDER IRPA
Despite the significant attention they have attracted in recent years,
security certificates have been a part of Canadian immigration law since
1978.8 Although the precise contours of the statutory regime have
evolved over time, its objective and basic features have remained fairly
consistent. The certificate process is intended to facilitate the removal of
non-citizens who endanger Canadian society because they are security
risks or serious criminals.9 Certificates initiate a special deportation
process that permits the government to rely on security or criminal
intelligence information which is not disclosed to the permanent resident
or foreign national named in the certificate (the “named person”) or their
lawyers in order to establish the alleged grounds of inadmissibility. The
certificate provisions also authorize detention or release on conditions
incidental to the deportation proceedings. Certificates are used in
relatively rare and exceptional cases; only 28 certificates have been
issued since 1991.10
The IRPA certificate provisions permit the Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration and the Minister of Public Safety (the “Ministers”) to
issue a certificate against a permanent or foreign national if they have
reasonable grounds to believe the named person is inadmissible on the
grounds of security, violating human or international rights, serious
criminality or organized criminality.11 In security related matters, the
Ministers’ decision usually is based on their review of a security
intelligence report (or “SIR”) prepared by the Canadian Security
Intelligence Service (“CSIS”). The power to issue a certificate rests with
8

Immigration Act, 1976, S.C. 1976-77, c. 52, ss. 39-43.
Charkaoui, supra, note 4, at para. 4.
10
Canada, Special Senate Committee on the Anti-terrorism Act, Fundamental Justice in
Extraordinary Times: Main Report of the Special Senate Committee on the Anti-terrorism Act
(Ottawa: February 2007) at 100-101, online at: <http://www.parl.gc.ca/39/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/
com-e/anti-e/rep-e/rep02feb07-e.htm> [hereinafter “Fundamental Justice in Extraordinary Times”].
11
Former IRPA, supra, note 8, at s. 77(1).
9
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the Ministers personally, and cannot be delegated.12 Once the Ministers
issue a certificate, it is referred to a designated judge of the Federal
Court together with the SIR. If the judge determines the certificate to be
reasonable, it becomes a final removal order.13
Under the IRPA provisions in effect when Charkaoui was argued
before the Supreme Court of Canada, the process for determining the
reasonableness of the certificate involved both ordinary open court
hearings and in camera, ex parte hearings where only counsel for the
Ministers appeared before the Court. The judge was required to hold an
in camera, ex parte hearing on the Ministers’ request.14 If the judge was
satisfied that disclosure of the information the Ministers presented at a
closed hearing would be injurious to national security or to the safety of
any person (“confidential security information”),15 then that information
remained confidential and could not be disclosed to the named person or
their counsel.16 However, the judge could rely on the confidential
security information and any other evidence considered appropriate to
determine whether the certificate was reasonable.17 Although the named
person did not receive the confidential security information, the
provisions required the judge to provide a summary enabling the named
person to be reasonably informed of the circumstances giving rise to the
certificate.18 The statute also required the judge to give the named person
an opportunity to be heard regarding the alleged inadmissibility.19 In
most cases, this generally permitted named persons to testify, call their
own witnesses and cross-examine witnesses the Ministers presented
during the open hearing.
The Federal Court judges conducting reasonableness hearings
assumed an active role during the in camera, ex parte hearings. Their
decisions demonstrated a rigorous testing of both the Ministers’ claim
that certain information could not be disclosed to the named person or
their counsel, as well as the reliability and sufficiency of that
information in establishing the alleged grounds of inadmissibility. The
12

Id., at s. 6(3).
Id., at ss. 80-81.
14
Id., at s. 78(e).
15
The types of information protected from non-disclosure are described in Henrie v.
Canada (Security Intelligence Review Committee), [1988] F.C.J. No. 965, 53 D.L.R. (4th) 568, at
578-79 (F.C.T.D.), affd [1992] F.C.J. No. 100, 88 D.L.R. (4th) 575 (F.C.A.).
16
Former IRPA, supra, note 8, at s. 78(b).
17
Id., at ss. 78(j) and 78(g).
18
Id., at s. 78(h).
19
Id., at s. 78(i).
13
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judges would, for example, closely examine the information to look for
the presence or absence of corroboration, and carefully scrutinize the
credibility of human sources.20
The detention provisions under the former IRPA certificate regime
differed for permanent residents and foreign nationals. Permanent
residents named in a certificate were detained only if the Ministers
issued a warrant.21 However, foreign nationals were detained without a
warrant once the Ministers issued the certificate.22 Permanent residents
had an initial detention review within 48 hours of their arrest, and
subsequent reviews at least once every six-month period until the judge
determined whether the certificate was reasonable.23 Foreign nationals
had no detention reviews before the reasonableness determination.
However, if a certificate against either a permanent resident or foreign
national was found to be reasonable and that person was not removed
within the next 120 days, he or she could then apply for a detention
review.24 The same in camera, ex parte hearing process that applied to
the reasonableness determination also applied to detention reviews.25
The determination that a certificate is reasonable does not
necessarily result in the named person’s immediate removal. If, prior to
the certificate being issued, the named person had been granted status as
a protected person, they can be removed only if the Minister issues a
danger opinion.26 Even if not previously recognized as a protected
person, the named person still could apply for a pre-removal risk

20
See, e.g., Re Harkat, [2005] F.C.J. No. 481, 2005 FC 393, at paras. 93-101 (F.C.A.); Re
Jaballah, [2006] F.C.J. No. 1706, 2006 FC 1230, at paras. 24-30 (F.C.A.); Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration) v. Mahjoub, [2005] F.C.J. No. 1948, 2005 FC 1596, at paras. 54-57
(F.C.A.).
21
Former IRPA, supra, note 8, at s. 82(1).
22
Id., at s. 82(2).
23
Id., at s. 83. At these pre-reasonableness reviews, the onus was on the Minister to satisfy
the judge that the named person continues to be a danger to national security or to the safety of any
person, or is unlikely to appear at a proceeding or for removal.
24
Id., at s. 84(2). At these post-reasonableness reviews, the onus was on the named person
to establish that they would not be removed from Canada within a reasonable time and that release
would not pose a danger to national security or to the safety of any person.
25
Id., at s. 83(1).
26
IRPA, supra, note 8, at s. 115. Where the inadmissibility is based on serious criminality,
the test is “danger to the public in Canada” (s. 115(1)). Where the inadmissibility is based on
security, violating human or international rights or organized criminality, the test is whether the
person “should not be allowed to remain in Canada on the basis of the nature and severity of acts
committed or of danger to the security of Canada” (s. 115(2)).
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assessment (“PRRA”) after the Ministers issued the certificate.27 The
danger opinion and PRRA processes are similar in that they both require
a Minister’s delegate to weigh the risk the named person would face if
removed from Canada against the danger they would pose if permitted to
remain in Canada. In some of the current certificate cases, the named
persons’ successfully challenged danger opinion decisions in favour of
removal, but have remained subject to detention or release on strict
conditions pending re-determination of the decisions.28

III. SETTING THE PARAMETERS: THE DECISION IN CHARKAOUI
Prior to Charkaoui, the validity of the security certificate regime had
been upheld on a number of occasions. For example, in Chiarelli, the
Supreme Court dismissed challenges to the constitutionality of the
certificate process brought by a permanent resident inadmissible for his
involvement in organized crime. The Court held that the process
satisfied the right to a fair hearing because the named person received a
summary of the confidential intelligence reports and could crossexamine police witnesses.29 In Ahani, the Federal Court of Appeal
rejected arguments that the certificate process applicable to foreign
nationals violated the Charter.30 And, in Suresh, the Supreme Court of
Canada contrasted the “extensive” procedural protections available at the
reasonableness determination stage against the lack of similar
protections at the danger opinion stage.31 Based largely on these
27
The reasonableness hearing was suspended pending the outcome of the PRRA
application: see former IRPA, supra, note 8, at s. 79. The PRRA decision weighs the danger of
torture, or risk to life or of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment the named person would face
if removed against the danger they pose if permitted to remain in Canada: see IRPA, supra, note 8,
at ss. 97, 112(3), 113(d) and 114(b). Where the inadmissibility is based on serious criminality, the
test is “danger to the public in Canada” (s. 113(d)(i)). Where the inadmissibility is based on security,
violating human or international rights or organized criminality, the test is “danger ... to the security
of Canada” (s. 113(d)(ii)).
28
See, e.g., Almrei v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] F.C.J. No.
437, 2005 FC 355 (F.C.A.); Mahjoub v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005]
F.C.J. No. 173, 2005 FC 156 (F.C.A.); Mahjoub v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), [2006] F.C.J. No. 1862, 2006 FC 1503 (F.C.A.).
29
Chiarelli v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] S.C.J. No. 27,
[1992] 1 S.C.R. 711 (S.C.C.).
30
Ahani v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1996] F.C.J. No. 937, 119
F.T.R. 80 (F.C.A.), affg [1995] F.C.J. No. 1190, [1995] 3 F.C. 669 (F.C.T.D.), leave to appeal to
S.C.C. refused [1996] S.C.C.A. No. 496, [1997] 2 S.C.R. v (S.C.C.).
31
Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] S.C.J. No. 3, [2002]
1 S.C.R. 3, at para. 117 (S.C.C.), stating the certificate provisions “allow for meaningful participation”.
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decisions, lower courts had consistently ruled that the IRPA certificate
regime was constitutional.32
The decision in Charkaoui, of course, departed from this previous
case law on the constitutionality of the security certificate process and
established a new starting point in the constitutional dialogue between
the judiciary and Parliament on the issue. However, in considering how
that dialogue set the parameters for future legislative action, it is
important to identify not only the specific constitutional deficiencies the
Court found in the certificate process, but also to recognize those aspects
of the regime which the Court found to comply with the Charter and the
scope of permissible action which the Court left open to Parliament.
In this respect, it is significant that the Court endorsed the general
objectives of the IRPA security certificate scheme. The Court accepted
that it is legitimate for Parliament to use immigration law to deport and
detain non-citizens who pose a threat to national security.33 The Court
also affirmed its earlier decision in Chiarelli that a deportation scheme
that applies to non-citizens but not to citizens does not, for that reason
alone, violate section 15 of the Charter.34 In doing so, the Court
impliedly rejected the suggestion that the state is somehow obligated to
prosecute under the criminal law instead of seeking deportation under
immigration law when faced with non-citizens suspected of involvement
in terrorist activities.35 The Court also expressly noted that so long as
detention pursuant to a certificate remains linked to an immigration
purpose, it does not amount to discrimination.36
The Court also held that detention or release on conditions pending
deportation pursuant to the certificate provisions violates neither sections
7 nor 12 of the Charter, even where that detention or release on
conditions might continue for extended or indeterminate periods of time.
In doing so, the Court clarified that detention under immigration law is
not unconstitutional where it is reasonably necessary for deportation
32

In the three cases at issue in Charkaoui, the courts below had dismissed all the
constitutional challenges to various aspects of the certificate regime: see Re Charkaoui, [2003]
F.C.J. No. 1815, 2003 FC 1418 (F.C.A.), affd [2004] F.C.J. No. 2060, 2004 FCA 421 (F.C.A.);
Almrei v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2004] F.C.J. No. 509, 2004 FC 420
(F.C.A.), affd [2005] F.C.J. No. 213, 2005 FCA 54 (F.C.A.); and Re Harkat, [2005] F.C.J. No. 481,
2005 FC 393 (F.C.A.), affd [2005] F.C.J. No. 1467, 2005 FCA 285 (F.C.A.).
33
Charkaoui, [2007] S.C.J. No. 9, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350, at paras. 68-69 (S.C.C.).
34
Id., at para. 129.
35
A number of intervenors before the Supreme Court of Canada, including the Canadian
Council for Refugees, had made this argument.
36
Charkaoui, supra, note 33, at paras. 130-32.
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purposes and a meaningful detention review process offers relief against
the possibility of indefinite detention. The Court was satisfied that,
properly interpreted, the IRPA contained a robust process for periodic
judicial review of detention or release on conditions which permitted the
courts to assess the relevant context and circumstances of the individual
case, including: the reasons for detention; length of detention; reasons
for delay in deportation; anticipated future length of detention; and the
availability of alternatives to detention.37
In addition, the Court dismissed a variety of other constitutional
challenges to the IRPA certificate scheme. For example, the Court held
that the “reasonable grounds to believe” standard for establishing
inadmissibility or grounds for detention did not violate section 7 of the
Charter. Similarly, the Court took no issue with the IRPA provision
directing the judge to determine the reasonableness of the certificate
rather than its correctness. The Court was satisfied that these standards
required a searching review of the evidence, and therefore did not detract
from the right to a fair hearing.38 The Court also held that unwritten
constitutional principles relating to the rule of law neither require a full
right of appeal from the reasonableness determination, nor prohibit the
Ministers from issuing warrants for arrest and detention if they have
reasonable grounds to believe that a named person is inadmissible on
specified grounds.39
Although the Court endorsed the general objectives of the IRPA
certificate process and found some of its features to be consistent with
the Constitution, it also found that two specific aspects of the former
statutory regime violated the Charter. First, the Court held that the
absence of a timely detention review process for foreign nationals
resulted in arbitrary detention and violated sections 9 and 10(c) of the
Charter.40 The Court afforded Parliament no flexibility in determining
how to address this shortcoming and, through a combination of striking
down and reading in, ensured that both foreign nationals and permanent
residents had access to timely and periodic detention reviews.41

37
Id., at paras. 95-128. The Court distinguished the decision of the House of Lords in A. v.
Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2004] UKHL 56 (H.L.) which struck down the control
order regime as incompatible with art. 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
38
Id., at paras. 38-42.
39
Id., at paras. 133-37.
40
Id., at paras. 3, 90-94.
41
Id., at paras. 141-42.

(2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d)

RESPONSE TO CHARKAOUI

423

More significantly, the Court held that the in camera, ex parte
hearing process and ability of the Ministers to rely on confidential
security information not disclosed to the named person or their lawyer
violated section 7 of the Charter. The Court found that this process was
inconsistent with the principles of fundamental justice because it lacked
two features required to ensure a fair hearing. First, because the
provisions limited the operation of the adversarial system but failed to
extend to judges all the powers associated with an inquisitorial system,
the Court was concerned that it may have resulted in judicial
determinations not based on all relevant facts or legal arguments.42 Chief
Justice McLachlin, for the unanimous Court, explained:
The designated judge under the IRPA does not possess the full and
independent powers to gather evidence that exist in the inquisitorial
process. At the same time, the named person is not given the disclosure
and the right to participate in the proceedings that characterize the
adversarial process. The result is a concern that the designated judge,
despite his or her best efforts to get all the relevant evidence, may be
obliged — perhaps unknowingly — to make the required decision
based on only part of the relevant evidence. 43

Second, the Court found that non-disclosure of the confidential security
information which formed the basis for the certificate deprived named
persons of the right to know and answer the case against them.44 On this
point, the Court drew a connection between the named person’s right to
know the case to meet and the judge’s ability to protect the integrity of
the judicial process:
The fairness of the IRPA procedure rests entirely on the shoulders of
the designated judge. Those shoulders cannot by themselves bear the
heavy burden of assuring, in fact and appearance, that the decision on
the reasonableness of the certificate is impartial, is based on a full view
of the facts and law, and reflects the named person’s knowledge of the
case to meet. The judge, working under the constraints imposed by the
IRPA, simply cannot fill the vacuum left by the removal of the
traditional guarantees of a fair hearing. 45

While the Court therefore concluded that the certificate process
violated the right to a fair hearing, the Court was cautious not to suggest
42
43
44
45

Id., at paras. 48-52.
Id., at para. 50.
Id., at paras. 53-65.
Id., at para. 63.
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that section 7 of the Charter mandated full disclosure of all confidential
security information to the named person and his or her lawyer. Indeed,
the Court clearly stated that the right to know the case to be met is not
absolute, that national security considerations can limit the extent of
disclosure that must be provided to an affected individual and that
societal concerns form part of the relevant context for determining the
scope of the applicable principles of fundamental justice.46 In addition, in
its conclusion on the section 7 issue, the Court indicated that the right to
a fair hearing could be satisfied either by giving the named person the
information required to know the case to meet, or a “substantial
substitute” for that information.47
The Court went on to find that the prima facie violation of section 7
could not be justified as a reasonable limit prescribed by law. Although
satisfied that the certificate process had a pressing and substantial
objective and that the non-disclosure of confidential security information
was rationally connected to that objective, the Court found that the
process was not minimally impairing of the named person’s Charter
rights.48 In this respect, the Court identified several less intrusive
alternatives which use a more adversarial process to ensure that an
independent party — other than the designated judge — tests the
confidential security information with a view to protecting the named
person’s interests.49 These alternatives included: the use of independent
counsel before the Security Intelligence Review Committee (the
“SIRC”);50 the use of special advocates in the United Kingdom before
the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (the “SIAC”);51 the
Canada Evidence Act process;52 the Air India trial example of disclosure
to defence counsel based on undertakings;53 and the role of commission
counsel in the Arar Inquiry.54 The Court concluded that the availability
of these less intrusive alternatives to the IRPA certificate process
demonstrated that it could not be justified under section 1.

46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54

Id., at paras. 57-58.
Id., at para. 61.
Id., at para. 68.
Id., at paras. 69-70.
Id., at paras. 71-76.
Id., at paras. 80-84.
Id., at para. 77.
Id., at para. 78.
Id., at para. 79.

(2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d)

RESPONSE TO CHARKAOUI

425

However, at the section 1 stage the Court again gave Parliament
considerable latitude to design a new process which would better protect
the named person’s section 7 interests without compromising security.
The Court recognized that Parliament is not required to use the perfect or
least restrictive alternative to achieve its objective.55 The Court suggested
that section 1 could be satisfied by providing some form of special
counsel to “objectively review the material with a view to protecting the
named person’s interest”, but expressed no strong preference for any of
the particular alternatives it had identified.56 In its conclusion on the
section 1 issue, the Court expressly stated that while more must be done
for the certificate process to meet the requirements of a free and
democratic society, “[p]recisely what more should be done is a matter
for Parliament to decide”.57 The Court also suspended its declaration of
unconstitutionality for a period of one year, citing only the need to give
Parliament time to amend the law.58

IV. PARLIAMENT’S RESPONSE: BILL C-3 AND
THE SPECIAL ADVOCATE REGIME
Government officials and Parliament used the one-year suspension
period to study the Charkaoui decision and carefully consider the
options available for responding to it. Those considerations were
informed not only by the Court’s ruling, but also the broader public
debate surrounding the security certificate process — including the
comments of the House of Commons and Senate committees who
reviewed the Anti-terrorism Act,59 the House of Commons Standing
Committee on Citizenship and Immigration’s report on security
certificates and detention,60 and the work of various academics and
55

Id., at para. 85.
Id., at para. 86.
57
Id., at para. 87.
58
Id., at para. 140.
59
Fundamental Justice in Extraordinary Times: Main Report of the Special Senate
Committee on the Anti-terrorism Act (Ottawa: February, 2007), at 30-42, 100-113, online at:
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/39/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/anti-e/rep-e/rep02feb07.htm> and House
Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, Subcommittee on the Review of the
Anti-terrorism Act, Rights, Limits, Security: A Comprehensive Review of the Anti-terrorism Act and
related Issues (Ottawa: March 2007), at 67-81, online at: <http://cmte.parl.gc.ca/cmte/
CommitteePublication.aspx?CDN=10804&Lang=1&SourceId=199086> [hereinafter “Rights, Limits,
Security”].
60
Twelfth Report of the House Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration,
“Detention Centres and Security Certificates”, adopted by the Committee on March 27, 2007,
56
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private sector lawyers on these issues.61 Consultations with SIRC
officials regarding their independent counsel process, as well as with
officials in the United Kingdom about their SIAC special advocate
regime, also contributed to the development of policy options.
Bill C-3 is the result of these efforts. It was tabled in the House of
Commons on October 22, 2007. Beginning on November 27, 2007, the
Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security heard from
over 20 witnesses during eight days of committee hearings, and then
reported the Bill back to the House of Commons with amendments on
December 10, 2007. The Senate passed the Bill without amendment and
it received royal assent on February 14, 2008. It came into force by order
of the Governor in Council on February 22, 2008 — one day before the
Supreme Court of Canada’s declaration of invalidity would have
expired.
The amendments Bill C-3 makes to the IRPA certificate process
demonstrate the different levels at which the dialogue between the
judiciary and Parliament may take place. In those areas where the Court
held that the Charter mandates a specific result, Parliament responded
accordingly. For example, the provisions for detention and release on
conditions now ensure that both permanent residents and foreign
nationals named in a certificate have detention reviews within 48 hours
of arrest. They also establish a system for regular six-month reviews of
detention or conditions of release which applies both before and after the
certificate is determined to be reasonable.62
Conversely, even in some areas where the Court upheld the
constitutionality of the previous certificate regime, Parliament elected to
address some issues that continued to affect the perceived fairness of the
process. In this regard, Bill C-3 provides a right of appeal from a
decision on reasonableness or detention review where the judge certifies

presented to the House on April 16, 2007, online at: <http://cmte.parl.gc.ca/Content/HOC/committee/
391/cimm/reports/rp2829796/cimmrp12/cimmrp12-e.pdf>.
61
See, e.g., C. Forcese & L. Waldman, Seeking Justice in an Unfair Process: Lessons from
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a serious question of general importance.63 Named persons therefore now
have the same rights of appeal as other litigants in immigration matters.64
Similarly, foreign nationals named in a certificate are no longer subject
to automatic detention when the certificate is issued. Instead, as with
permanent residents, the Ministers must decide whether to issue a
warrant for arrest.65 In addition, and although it was not in issue before
the Court in Charkaoui, Bill C-3 codifies earlier Federal Court decisions
and expressly states that evidence obtained by torture or cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment is inadmissible in certificate
proceedings.66
Finally, on the major issue of the right to a fair hearing where the
Court indicated that the Charter required greater procedural protections
but did not stipulate precisely what more should be done, Parliament
studied the options available and adopted the solution it considered most
appropriate: a special advocate regime.
In general, special advocates are security-cleared lawyers who are
independent from both government and the courts. They are granted
access to the confidential security information on the condition they not
disclose it to anybody else, including the named person and their lawyer.
The Bill requires the Court to appoint special advocates to protect the
interests of the named person at hearings from which the public, the
named person and their lawyer are excluded. They can challenge both
the government’s claim that information should remain confidential, as
well as the merits of the case against the named person presented in
closed hearings. In this way, special advocates will add an adversarial
context to the closed hearings and thereby help to ensure that the named
person’s right to a fair hearing is respected. At the same time, Bill C-3
also includes measures to minimize the risk that confidential security
information might be improperly disclosed as a result of the new special
advocate regime. In this manner, Bill C-3 resolves the tension between
respecting the named person’s Charter-protected right to a fair hearing
and the interest in protecting confidential security information.
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Id., at ss. 79 and 82.3 [am. S.C. 2008, c. 3, s. 4, in force February 22, 2008].
Id., at s. 74(d).
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While Charkaoui addressed only the security certificate process, the
new special advocate provisions also apply, with the necessary
modifications, to admissibility hearings and detention reviews before the
Immigration and Refugee Board where the Minister seeks to rely on
confidential security information.67 Bill C-3 also gives the Federal Court
the discretion to determine whether the considerations of fairness and
natural justice require that a special advocate be appointed for the
judicial review of other decisions made under IRPA where the decisionmaker relied on confidential security information which cannot be
disclosed.68
The basic premise underlying the IRPA special advocate scheme, its
various features, their rationale and subsequent implementation are
discussed briefly under separate subheadings below.
1. Special Advocate Role and Powers
Section 85.1(1) states the role of the special advocate is to “protect
the interests” of the named person during the closed hearings. Section
85.1(2) empowers special advocates to fulfil this role in two ways. First,
they may challenge the Ministers’ claim that information must remain
confidential because disclosure to the public and the named person or
that person’s counsel would be injurious to national security or endanger
the safety of any person. Second, they may challenge the relevance,
reliability and sufficiency of the information and other evidence the
Ministers adduce at the closed hearings to make their case. Section 85.2
allows special advocates to make oral and written submissions with
respect to the information the Ministers present at closed hearings, to
cross-examine any witnesses who testify during the closed hearings and
to exercise any other powers that the judge considers necessary to
protect the interests of the named person.
This wording of the special advocate’s role in section 85.1(1) is
significant. It is not simply an element of the IRPA special advocate
regime; it is the model’s defining principle. The special advocate does
not “represent” the named person in the same sense that a lawyer
represents a client. Indeed, section 85.1(3) expressly states that the
special advocate is not in a solicitor-client relationship with the named
person. This limitation avoids creating a potential conflict between the
67
68
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duties of loyalty and candour lawyers owe to clients and the special
advocate’s obligation not to disclose the confidential security
information. In this way, the core premise underlying the special
advocate model avoids some of the thorny ethical and practical
difficulties inherent in the Air India model, which the Supreme Court
itself acknowledged in Charkaoui.69
However, and notwithstanding the absence of a solicitor-client
relationship with the named person, special advocates are not just an
objective third party added to the closed hearing process. Instead, they
are directly aligned with the interests of the named person and play an
adversarial function vis-à-vis the government. This is consistent with the
suggestion in Charkaoui that the closed hearing process requires some
form of special counsel to objectively test the government’s case “with a
view to protecting the named person’s interests”, and the
recommendations of the Senate Anti-terrorism Act review committee.70 It
also distinguishes the basic premise underlying the IRPA special
advocate model from that underlying the SIRC independent counsel
model or the Arar Inquiry commission counsel model.
Lawyers acting as SIRC counsel or commission counsel are
independent in the sense that they are counsel to SIRC or the
commission and independent from government. They are not, however,
independent from the tribunal which they serve. Indeed, the basic
premise underlying these independent counsel models is the need to
extend the tribunal’s own ability to ensure a fair hearing: the overriding
duty of independent counsel is to the tribunal, not to individual
complainants; and their role is to protect the integrity of the tribunal’s
process, not the interests of the individual excluded from the closed
hearings. While those interests often may be aligned, that will not
necessarily always be the case. In contrast, Bill C-3 expressly assigns
special advocates a more adversarial role directly aligned with the named
person’s interests. In this way, the core premise of the IRPA special
69

See Charkaoui, [2007] S.C.J. No. 9, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350, at para. 78 (S.C.C.), where the
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advocate model goes further than the SIRC independent counsel model
to protect the interests of the named person and make the process more
truly adversarial in nature.
2. Communications with Named Person
The IRPA special advocate provisions contemplate two phases in the
communication between the special advocate and the named person
during certificate proceedings. The first phase occurs before the special
advocate is given access to the confidential security information. During
this phase, communication between the named person and special
advocate is unrestricted. The second phase begins once the special
advocate is given access to the confidential security information. During
this phase, the special advocate cannot communicate with the named
person unless and except as authorized by the judge.71
The first phase provides the special advocate an opportunity to learn
as much as possible about the named person’s case in response to the
allegations. Once the judge appoints the special advocate, he or she
receives the same summary of confidential security information and any
other public evidence which is provided to the named person and his or
her lawyer to ensure this special advocate is reasonably informed of the
Ministers’ case.72 Based on this open information, the special advocate
can meet with the named person and his or her lawyer to discuss the case
without restriction. Although they are not in a solicitor-client relationship,
section 85.1(4) provides that communications between the named person
and special advocate are subject to the same privilege that would attach
as if a solicitor-client relationship did exist. In addition, special advocates
cannot be compelled to give testimony in any proceeding about
communications with a named person.73 Named persons therefore can
provide any and all potentially relevant information to the special
advocates during the first phase, without fear that providing information
which may prove to be inculpatory would somehow disadvantage the
named person’s position in the closed certificate hearings or any other
proceedings.
The IRPA regime does not bar all communication between the
special advocate and the named person during the second phase. Instead,
71
72
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it seeks to balance the special advocate’s ability to effectively perform
his or her function with the need to protect against the risk that special
advocates might inadvertently disclose confidential security information
to the named persons or their lawyers. This is consistent with the Senate
Anti-terrorism Act review committee’s recommendations, which not
only encouraged a scheme that permitted ongoing communication
between the special advocate and named person, but also recommended
that Parliament adopt appropriate safeguards as a part of any such
scheme to ensure that matters of national security remain secret.74 The
process for balancing these two objectives under Bill C-3 requires the
designated judge — not the government — to determine how best to
reconcile, in the particular circumstances of any given case, the potential
benefits of further communication between the named person and special
advocate with the potential risks of inadvertent disclosure of confidential
security information that any such communications may raise.
Criticisms of this aspect of Bill C-3 typically emphasize that the
special advocate’s ability to effectively perform his or her role may, in
some cases, require him or her to go back to the named person for
information only after seeing the confidential security information.75
However, Bill C-3 does allow for this possibility if the judge is satisfied
that the scope and form of the communications are appropriate. What
Bill C-3 also requires the judge to take into account — and what the
criticisms frequently ignore or understate — is the countervailing and
legitimate state interest in preventing inadvertent disclosure of the
confidential security information. The very nature of this information
means that the stakes are high if inadvertent disclosure occurs:
confidential informers may be identified and their lives or security
thereby placed in jeopardy; an ongoing investigation may be
compromised and years of valuable intelligence-gathering rendered
useless. The need to protect confidential informers from the risk of
possible retribution is particularly sensitive in the national security
context. Bill C-3 therefore provides a reasonable oversight mechanism
which aims to prevent the inadvertent disclosure of any such
information. Proposed alternatives — like the suggestion that an
independent third party, such as a member of SIRC, be present during
any communications between the named person and special advocate
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during the closed phase76 — may help identify inadvertent disclosure
after it happens, but would not necessarily help prevent it before it
occurs in the same way as does Bill C-3.
In the United Kingdom, the need for special advocates to obtain
judicial authorization to communicate with the named person during the
“closed” phase of proceedings has attracted criticism from parliamentary
committees.77 Special advocates themselves reportedly are reluctant to
seek judicial authorization in part because the relevant statutory
provisions require proposed communications to be reviewed not only by
the judge but also by the government.78 However, notwithstanding those
criticisms, the British government has maintained its position that this
requirement is an appropriate safeguard, and declined to amend the
relevant statutory provisions.79 Moreover, the House of Lords declined to
seize upon these criticisms in its October 2007 ruling that proceedings
involving special advocates generally will not fail to comply with the
right to a fair hearing protected under Article 6 of the European
Convention.80 Indeed, at least one of the Law Lords encouraged all
parties involved in the cases to consider whether special advocates
should be given leave to ask specific and carefully tailored questions of
the named person so as to preserve the fairness of the trial.81 The
comments imply not only that the statutory provision itself is reasonable,
but also that those involved in the process — including not only the
judge, but also the special advocate and government counsel — have
some responsibility to use it appropriately.
76
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3. The Special Advocate List
Subsection 85(1) requires the Minister of Justice to establish and
publish a list of persons who may act as special advocates. The creation
of a list ensures that there is a qualified pool of security-cleared lawyers
eligible to be appointed to specific cases as required and without delay.
The Minister also must ensure that special advocates are provided with
“adequate administrative support and resources”.82 These responsibilities
are consistent with the Minister of Justice’s statutory responsibility for
matters relating to the administration of justice under the Department of
Justice Act.83 They also reflect the importance of the special advocate in
not only protecting the interests of the named person, but also preserving
the fairness, integrity and efficiency of the justice system.
While the Bill makes the Minister of Justice responsible for
establishing the special advocate list, the Minister has established an
independent selection committee to assist with this process. The
selection committee is comprised of retired Federal Court judge Andrew
MacKay and one representative from each of the Federation of Canadian
Law Societies (the “FLSC”) and the Canadian Bar Association (“CBA”).
The Department of Justice first invited expressions of interest from
candidates wishing to be named to the special advocate list on December
22, 2007, and extended the initial deadline from January 15, 2008 to
February 1, 2008 in order to ensure that interested individuals had
sufficient time to apply. The selection committee reviewed all
applications received, and recommended that the Minister of Justice
name some of the best qualified candidates to the special advocate list.
To date, the Minister has named 27 candidates who the selection
committee recommended and who then obtained the requisite security
clearance.84
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4. Special Advocate Qualifications
Section 87.2(2) requires that special advocates be members in good
standing of a provincial bar and not be employed in the federal public
administration or otherwise associated with the federal public
administration in a way that would impair their ability to protect the
interests of the named person. This confirms that the special advocate
must be independent of the government.
The Minister of Justice established a number of other qualifications
for the selection committee to consider when appointing special
advocates to the initial list. Those qualifications required that special
advocates have a minimum of 10 years’ good standing in a provincial
bar, and litigation experience that demonstrates skill in the examination
of witnesses and in oral and written advocacy. In addition, although not
a mandatory requirement, experience in the fields of immigration law,
criminal law, national security law or human rights law was considered
an asset. These qualifications were developed in consultation with
representatives from the FLSC and the CBA. They are intended to
ensure that special advocates have the requisite skills and experience to
effectively fulfil their statutory role and responsibilities.85
In addition to these qualifications, special advocates also must obtain
Top Secret security clearance from CSIS before they can be named to
the list. This is widely acknowledged as an essential minimum
qualification for special advocates.86 Under both the SIRC and SIAC
models, special counsel’s access to confidential security information and
participation in closed hearings is contingent on obtaining appropriate
security clearance. Special advocates therefore have to go through the
same security screening measures that CSIS uses to determine whether
government officials are sufficiently reliable and trustworthy to be
granted access to sensitive security information.87 In addition, as has
been the case with lawyers employed as commission counsel for recent
federal commissions of inquiry involving confidential security
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information, special advocates are permanently bound to secrecy under
the Security of Information Act.88
5. Choosing the Special Advocate for a Particular Case
While the Minister of Justice is responsible for establishing the
special advocate list, the judge who hears a certificate case is responsible
for appointing a lawyer from the list to act as special advocate in a
particular case. Subsection 83(1)(b) requires that the judge make this
appointment after hearing representations both from the government and
the named person, and after giving “particular consideration and weight
to the preferences” of the named person. Subsection 83(1.2) elaborates
on this point and requires the judge to appoint the named person’s choice
of special advocate from the list, unless the judge is satisfied that the
appointment would unreasonably delay the proceedings or result in a
conflict of interest or risk of inadvertent disclosure of the confidential
security information.89 The weight given to the named person’s choice of
special advocate under the IRPA scheme addresses concerns which had
previously been raised about the SIAC model where the named person
had little or no say in who would be appointed as special advocate, and
is consistent with the recommendations of the Senate Anti-terrorism Act
review committee.90
These provisions aim to balance the named person’s interest in
selecting the special advocate the named person feels will best protect
his or her interests in the closed hearings with the need to avoid putting
special advocates in situations that are incompatible with their ethical
obligations as lawyers or that present an increased risk of inadvertent
disclosure. The judge’s power to decline to appoint the named person’s
choice of special advocate to a particular case due to a conflict of interest
applies familiar conflict concepts to the unique situation of lawyers
acting as special advocates.91 In this context, the conflicting duties may
88
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not be between different past or present clients, but rather between duties
owed as a lawyer to a client and their duties as a special advocate not to
disclose confidential security information. The judge’s power to refuse
an appointment where it would give rise to a risk of inadvertent
disclosure resembles the concept of “tainting” under the SIAC scheme,
and is based on a similar rationale.92 The provision is not intended to
allow the judge to reassess the reliability of a lawyer who already has
obtained security clearance from CSIS and been named to the special
advocate list by the Minister of Justice, but rather requires the judge to
examine whether a risk of inadvertent disclosure may result if a special
advocate acts in two or more cases that involve overlapping or related
confidential security information.
The government accepts that, depending on the complexity of the
case and the volume of confidential security information at issue and any
other relevant factors, the Court may determine that two special
advocates should be appointed to protect the interests of the named
person in a security certificate case. This is consistent with practice in
the United Kingdom, where two special advocates generally are
appointed for at least the more complex SIAC cases. The Federal Court
has appointed two special advocates for each of the five current
certificate cases.
6. Support and Resources
As mentioned, section 85(3) makes the Minister of Justice
responsible for ensuring that special advocates are provided with
“adequate administrative support and resources”. In the United
Kingdom, a lack of administrative support and resources for special
advocates previously attracted criticism, and resulted in the creation of
the Special Advocate Support Office (“SASO”) within the Treasury
Board Solicitors’ Department of the Attorney General’s Office to
provide a range of support services.93 Based largely on these
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developments in the United Kingdom, commentators have emphasized
the importance of ensuring that special advocates have an appropriate
support apparatus under the IRPA regime.94
At this time, the Minister of Justice has arranged to provide special
advocates with various administrative and resource support through a
combination of the Department of Justice (the “DOJ”), the Federal
Courts Administration Service (the “CAS”) and the Immigration and
Refugee Board (the “IRB”). Under these arrangements, the Programs
Branch within DOJ’s Policy Sector — a section of the DOJ separate
from that responsible for conduct of litigation in security certificate
cases — is responsible for coordinating the work of the selection
committee, publishing the special advocate list, and some of the more
routine administrative matters such as paying special advocate accounts.
In addition, the CAS will ensure that special advocates are provided with
secure facilities for consultation of the confidential security information
and some administrative support when they are working on the secure
site premises. The Minister has made similar arrangements with the IRB
for special advocates assigned to section 86 cases. Representatives from
DOJ, CAS and the IRB will be consulting directly with special
advocates to discuss further support and resources they may require.
In addition, and as part of fulfilling the Minister’s responsibilities
under section 85(3), the DOJ has organized week-long training sessions
for the lawyers named to the special advocate list. The instructors for the
training sessions have included senior federal government officials,
leading academics on national security law issues, prominent private
sector immigration lawyers and barristers who have acted as special
advocates in the United Kingdom. The subjects have included: specific
legal principles and processes relevant to certificate cases; general
background on immigration law; and the role of the special advocate.
The training also included presentations by CSIS officials on how to
read confidential security information, as well as the protocols for
handling such information.

V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The decision in Charkaoui and legislative response in Bill C-3
demonstrate how the Charter dialogue between the judiciary and
legislatures can enhance the protection of constitutionally entrenched
94
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rights and freedoms while preserving the ability of elected officials to
pursue legitimate policy objectives. In Charkaoui, the Supreme Court of
Canada challenged Parliament to devise a new hearing process for
certificate cases which would resolve the tension between accountable
constitutional governance and national security.95 In doing so, the Court
clearly accepted that more than one solution was available to resolve that
tension, and that Parliament was better positioned to decide on which
solution should be adopted. Parliament, after considering the various
options left open to it by the Court, decided to meet the challenge by
adding a special advocate to the certificate process.
The various features of the special advocate regime — including
the role and powers of special advocates, the provisions relating to
communications, the special advocate selection process and qualifications,
and the support and resources available to special advocates — all are
designed to ensure that the interests of the named person in a fair hearing
are adequately protected, while also minimizing the risk that confidential
security information might be disclosed. Of course, not everybody
agrees that the constitutional dialogue has resulted in a process which
now complies with the Charter. Indeed, counsel for at least some of the
named persons in the current certificate cases already have filed
challenges to the constitutionality of Bill C-3. However, as the Supreme
Court itself reiterated in Charkaoui, Parliament is not required to use the
perfect or least restrictive alternative to achieve its legislative objective.
In our respectful view, the IRPA special advocate regime does
undoubtedly better protect the named person’s right to a fair hearing
while still ensuring that national security is not compromised. It is
difficult to see how — particularly in light of the Court’s deference to
Parliament’s legislative choices and the rational explanations available
to justify the various aspects of the special advocate regime which have
attracted criticism — the new balance between protecting fundamental
rights and freedoms and safeguarding national security which Parliament
has achieved under Bill C-3 would fail to pass constitutional scrutiny.
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